Finally, on 16 November 2014, the six GCC heads of state signed the third Riyadh agreement (also known as the Riyadh Complementary Agreement). The third agreement confirmed the material provisions of the first two agreements and added two other important principles. First, it “emphasizes that the non-commitment of one of the articles of the Riyadh Agreement and its executive mechanism constitutes a violation of all of them.” Second, on November 16, 2014, the six GCC foreign ministers signed a second agreement that implemented the 2013 agreements and provided additional details. In March 2014, three member states (Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain) took the unprecedented step of withdrawing their ambassadors from Qatar. (1) This incident was the first of its kind in the history of the GCC and spans more than three decades. These measures were taken in response to a Qatari policy that the other three countries considered incompatible with the security agreement signed by the six Member States in January 2014. As part of this agreement, Member States appeared to have accepted a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of another Member State, either directly or indirectly, as well as a policy of non-assistance of a party, organisation or individual who wanted to endanger the security and stability of one of the GCC States, whether through direct action. , political influence or the support of hostile media. (2) In 2013 and 2014, following the Arab Spring, Qatar signed a series of agreements under the auspices of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to peacefully resolve disputes between itself and several states that would later form the Quartet. The existence and content of the so-called Riyadh agreements were the subject of speculation for several years before they were made public in 2017. Each of these agreements is rare and sometimes imprecise, resulting in a number of possibilities for the implementation of each of the different agreements.

This time, it won`t be as easy to fix the flaw as signing an unpublished statement in 2014. Trump`s visit to Riyadh, the successful summit and Trump`s strong support for Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – particularly the government`s priorities in the fight against terrorism and the confrontation with Iran, the two main complaints against Qatar – all played an important role in calling for the resumption of pressure on Doha to change its behavior. Trump stressed unity in Riyadh, and the flaw is likely to disrupt Washington, although he said he shared some of the concerns about Qatar`s behavior. They said the 13 requests to the Qatari government last month were set out in previous agreements and “in full respect of the spirit of what was agreed,” according to a statement reported by the national news agency WAM. Former secret documents show commitments made by Doha in 2013 and 2014 to other Arab countries. The crisis, symbolized by the withdrawal of the ambassadors of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (United Arab Emirates) and the Kingdom of Bahrain in Doha in March 2014, was the first of its kind since the creation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), setting a precedent for the settlement of disputes between the six member states. The differences that triggered the withdrawal of ambassadors have been among the most serious in recent years and have seriously threatened to undermine relations between GCC countries. The crisis certainly had a negative impact on the GCC at first – which raised questions between Member States, revealed changes in their political agendas and changed, to some extent, the balance of power in the region. In January 2014, other Gulf Arab countries tried to persuade Qatar to sign a comprehensive agreement on non-interference in each other`s affairs, cooperate on regional issues and refuse to support extremist groups.